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1 Trattandosi di una prima stesura di appunti destinati a studenti, correzioni, sugge-
rimenti e commenti sono particolarmente desiderati. 3
Abstract
Define reasonable both a strategy whose best response leads to a 
state Pareto superior to the Nash equilibrium and a player that al-
ways chooses a maximal reasonable strategy. In a finitely repeated 
prisoners’ dilemma, reasonableness requires playing cooperative till 
almost the end of the game, supported by a threat of a just sufficient 
punishment if the other does not play cooperative. Assume players 
know both have the choice between following reasonableness or us-
ing backward induction in deciding which move to make at any 
stage of the game. This generates an underlying stag hunt game in 
which both choosing reasonableness is a Nash equilibrium which 
dominates the one in which both follow backward induction. It is 
argued that, given common knowledge of rationality, substantively 
rational players would choose reasonableness in the underlying 
game, and therefore cooperation in the overt one, for most of the 
hands, they would be uncertain about the rational choice towards the 
end of the game, and use backward induction only at the very end. 
Common knowledge – rationality – backward induction – reason-
ableness – incomplete information – finite prisoners’ dilemma 
JEL: C72 4
Introduction
In most of game theory it is assumed that games can be defined in 
such a way as to admit only one reading. What is claimed is that this 
assumption is dubious for many cases of multi-stage games, and in 
particular for games that have inefficient Nash equilibria. If a game 
admits more than one reading, players must decide how to play not 
only the overt game,
2 but also an underlying one,
3 in which the 
choice is the reading of it to adopt. If the underlying game also ad-
mits more than one reading, one has to face a possibly infinite se-
quence of underlying games in which, at each stage, the choice is 
how to read the game of the preceding stage. Substantive rationality 
in the solution of these underlying games can disqualify what ap-
pears to be the substantively rational behaviour in the overt game. 
In this paper I examine the case of the finitely repeated prisoner’s 
dilemma.
4 The usual way to support the claim that substantive ra-
tionality requires defection from the start in this game relies on ra-
tionality implying backward induction (bi). But this dilemma is an 
example often used to show that it is doubtful that substantive ra-
tionality is instrumentally justified, that it is a, if not the, best mean 
for pursuing one’s aims. If it is not instrumentally justified, and the 
adoption of substantive rationality is a choice, one has problems in 
claiming that a substantive rational agent should use substantive ra-
tionality in these conditions. 
To avoid the dire predicament to which substantive rationality is 
taken to lead, one introduces some uncertainty about the rationality 
of the players. Player A can induce B to discard the assumption that 
A is substantively rational simply by playing cooperative at the first 
stage. In this way one allows some communication between agents, 
though the message is unclear. Simply to appear as not substantively 
rational leaves B with no hunches on what to do.
5 A needs to be 
                                                     
2 That will also be called a level 1 game. 
3 A level 2 game. 
4 But a similar reasoning can be applied to the centipede game. 
5 See, for example, Reny (1992) and (1995). 5
taken as affected by a particular kind of “irrationality”, as being a tit 
for tat player, to induce a substantively rational B to play coopera-
tive till almost the end of the game.
6
It is not clear A has a way to induce this belief in B, and, in turn, he 
has no reason to believe B is such a player, if B plays cooperative. 
But if he succeeds in this enterprise, it turns out that tit for tat is in-
strumentally superior to backward induction and yet is inconsistent 
with substantive rationality. Since the use of backward induction is 
not substantively rational, being instrumentally inferior to tit for tat, 
it would then seem unclear what substantive rationality actually re-
quires.
What will be shown is that, in a world in which rationality is com-
mon knowledge, playing cooperative actually sends a much more 
readable and credible message, that of adopting consistently a 
method of choice which leads to implement what will be called a 
reasonable strategy. At the beginning of the game, a rational person 
has the choice between following reasonableness or backward in-
duction. To the overt, later called a level 1, game, one attaches an 
underlying, level 2, game in which a player has to choose between 
these two options. If substantive rationality is used at level 2, it is 
consistent with playing reasonable in the level 1 game.
7
                                                     
6 This is the solution of Kreps - Milgrom - Roberts - Wilson (1982). 
7 If one wants to go on believing in the rationality of the other, one must 
find a way to make consistent playing cooperative at some stages, with the 
fact that one is sure that substantive rationality requires non cooperation at 
least at the last stage.6
A definition of reasonableness 
To be qualified as reasonable in the overt game, a strategy must be 
such that, coupled with its best response, leads to a state which is 
not Pareto dominated by that which would be reached if both used, 
in the case at hand, the Nash equilibrium strategy.
8 A reasonable 
player is one that adopts his best reasonable strategy, denoted as rea 
in what follows. 
What a reasonable player does, is to give up the use of backward in-
duction, since, when it has any scope, reasonableness dictates a 
strategy that is not a best response to the its best response. 
Of course, it is sensible for A to act reasonable if and only if he can 
expect to be taken as such by B, which will then adopt a best re-
sponse to the reasonable strategy of A, so B must know of the possi-
bility of reasonableness and believe that it is rational for a rational A 
to follow it. Here, the fact that, in the usual rendering, the prisoners’ 
dilemma is a symmetric game, helps. 
A characterization of reasonable strategies 
In a finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma, moves are simultaneous 
and common knowledge of substantive rationality is taken to imply 
the use of backward induction, and then non cooperation from the 
start, the (bi; bi) equilibrium. However, it is easy to show that rea-
sonable strategies exist for both players. 
The obvious one is the trigger strategy: start with cooperation and 
keep cooperating till the other does; from the stage in which the 
other turns non cooperative, play non cooperative till the end of the 
game. It is easy to see that it dominates any strategy which induces a 
best response with a shorter span of cooperation but, of course, one 
                                                     
8 Note that reasonableness requires to play a Nash equilibrium strategy in a 
one shot prisoners’ dilemma, so that reasonableness does not rule out sub-
stantive rationality if circumstances are appropriate. In the relevant cases, 
however, reasonableness requires choices inconsistent with a Nash equilib-
rium in the overt game, and will be used in this sense in what follows. 7
knows that by itself the announcement of such a strategy will not 
produce any effect unless it justifies doubts about the rationality
9 the 
player that makes it intends to adopt; furthermore though it is a rea-
sonable strategy, it is not the best of this kind and, more, it is not ac-
tually consistent with reasonableness. 
It has the usual problems of credibility, indeed, when coupled with 
reasonableness, it exacerbates them. Would it be reasonable for a 
reasonable person to give up reasonableness when faced by a devia-
tion by the other at the first stage of a long round? If one were 
known to be reasonable, such doubts would invite the other player at 
least to a period, possibly long, of testing of the resolve to reason-
ableness of the first.
10
The advice never to use disproportionate threats here holds a forti-
ori. More lenient strategies can produce the same effects of the 
harsh strategy, at a much lower cost, allowing a best response which 
leads to  Pareto superior results so that they accord better with rea-
sonableness. The simplest is: start playing cooperative and go on 
with cooperation till the other does; after a defection by the other, 
play non cooperative for a number of stages just sufficient to reduce 
the gains of the defaulter below those he would have got if coopera-
tion had gone on over that interval
11 and then go back to coopera-
tion.
12
With lenient strategies, a deviation only requires ministration of the 
threatened punishment. Going back to cooperation afterwards entails 
                                                     
9 Actually, in the context of this discussion, the kind of rationality. 
10 The problems of such a harsh strategy are better seen from a different 
viewpoint on which we will come back later. 
11 Possibly making the length of the period of punishment conditional on 
the behaviour kept by the other in this span of the game, for example, shor-
tening it if the other plays cooperative before the end of the announced 
round of punishments. 
12 For example, assume that one stage of non cooperation is sufficient to 
wipe out the gains obtained by defaulting a cooperator; then, punish the de-
faulter for one period by playing non cooperative and after that go back to 
cooperation. Such a strategy, while very similar, could avoid some un-
pleasant consequences of a tit-for-tat strategy, such as, for example, the 
possibility of consistent non cooperation. 8
no loss of face, but on the contrary, reasserts it; one can then be 
much more confident about using the past as a predictor of future 
behaviour in the underlying game.
13 The strategies just outlined al-
low then some communication and learning between the players, 
which is not cheap but neither very costly, about the kind of ration-
ality they intend to use.
14
The first step of the reasoning requires outlining how a reasonable 
strategy looks like. 
Let c and nc be the cooperative and non-cooperative strategy in the 
stage game and normalize payoffs as in Kreps - Milgrom - Roberts - 
Wilson (1982). The payoff matrix is then: 
1 \ 2  nc  c 
nc  0 ; 0  a ; b 
c  b ; a  1 ; 1 
with a > 1 and b < 0, so that the Nash equilibrium in the stage game 
gives 0 to both players.  
Let na be the smallest integer greater than a, na-1 the smallest integer 
greater than a – 1, the length of a just sufficient punishment in case 
of deviation by the other, and nb the smallest integer greater than 
⏐b⏐.
15
                                                     
13 The fact that, with “just sufficiently harsh” strategies, establishing one’s 
character is advantageous for a player allows to dispense with the infinite 
hierarchy of threats of punishments of the player who does not minister pu-
nishment when he should. 
14 It allows a distrustful player to test whether the other is playing rea, and 
each knows he too can be tested. And if one meets a substantively rational 
player who does not see any room in his world for reasonableness, one has 
means to try to convince him, though they will not necessarily be success-
ful.
15 It is assumed that a + b > 1, and that na > nb. If a + b < 2, one has also 
that na - nb ≤ 1. If a + b > 2, rational cooperative players would use a more 
complicated strategy than the “always cooperate unless …” here consid-
ered, for example they could agree on 1 playing c and 2 nc at even stages 
reversing roles at odd stages, but it is easy to adapt the reasoning to con-
sider also this case. 9
Suppose the game is repeated N times. What has to be justified in 
this setting is the emergence of cooperation, and this must be based 
on the rationality of reasonableness. 
At stage n > N – nb, no player has a reasonable strategy, since there 
is no strategy which coupled with its best response gives a player a 
payoff at least as great as that associated to consistent use of nc  and 
so rationality requires they play nc.
16
From stage n = N – na to stage n = N – nb, both have a reasonable 
strategy, and, in this situation, reasonableness simply requires to 
play always c till the end of the game.
17 Sticking to the reasonable 
strategy till the end, even if both do so, does not give better results 
than using bi from stage N – na,
18 and gives worse results to the 
player that does so if the other shifts to bi before the end. Further-
more, both know that rationality requires defecting as soon as one 
reaches N – nb + 1. 
Note however that this last step requires the use of backward induc-
tion. If they are rational and have always played nc in the preceding 
stages, they must have justified their choices through backward in-
duction. Not only adoption of reasonableness from any of these 
stages onward is not credible by the other player, but is inconsistent 
with the reasoning followed up to that stage and therefore irrational 
for the player that considers whether to adopt it. 
What is usually claimed is that in a world of rational players in 
which rationality is common knowledge, the only possible history is 
one of consistent non cooperation. What is claimed in this paper is 
that, if they can choose, rational players can adopt reasonableness. If 
this claim holds, they must consider how to play if the history from 
which they come is one of a sequence of cooperative stages. For a 
rational player, to play c is to have given up the use of backward in-
                                                     
16 Notice that, if nb ≥ 2, there is an incentive to delay playing out the con-
flict about being the one that defects just before the other does, but there 
are no means to convince each other that it is credible the conflict will be 
delayed. 
17 Note that the best response to this strategy is to play nc only at N. 
18 And does not promise better results than playing successfully a trick at 
any of those stages, i. e., in this case, playing c at the current stage while 
planning to play nc next stage and then till the end. 10
duction in the previous stages; if this has been done intentionally, 
consistency requires one to have a reason not for going on to play c, 
but for revising this choice, for starting to use backward induction 
and therefore shift to using nc.  
The use of backward induction requires and implies taking what has 
gone on before the stage one is considering as irrelevant to the deci-
sion one has to make at that moment. In fact, however, if rationality 
implies consistency of the criteria used in one’s decisions, what has 
gone on before, if cooperation has been observed, can question the 
rationality of using backward induction. 
Persisting in reasonableness till nb included, even if the other plays 
accommodating against such a strategy, gives better results to both 
than playing nc consistently from N – na onwards.
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Actually, as the payoff matrix for the remaining stages in fig. 1 
shows, for N – na ≤ n < N - nb, the accommodating strategy not only 
requires the same sequence of moves required by the reasonable 
one, except in the last step, but dominates the reasonable one and is 
the best response to the other playing accommodating. So, at least at 
these stages, the game in which the choice is between playing ac-
commodating till N – nb or using consistently bi has the form of a 11
stag hunt game with both players opting for accommodation
19 and 
both using consistently bi are the two Nash equilibria in pure strate-
gies. Furthermore, it is common knowledge for the players that they 
must face such a symmetric game. One can
20 then give a positive 
probability to players using accommodation or reasonableness, and 
therefore to their playing c. 
Then, if one comes from a history of reasonableness or accommoda-
tion, in a sense, one can go on following the same rule or leave to 
chance the decision on whether and when to stop using c.
21 Anyway, 
keeping alive the probability that c will be played is profitable for 
both with respect to both shifting to the use of backward induction. 
But if bi is played, trying to resurrect accommodation is irrational if 
na ≤ 2 nb,
22 and seems unlikely to be successful even otherwise. 
From stage n = N – na – nb to stage N – na both have a reasonable 
strategy, that in this case requires playing c if the other has played c 
in the previous stage but playing nc for na stages from the stage in 
which the other plays nc as a punishment, reverting to c as soon as 
the punishment period is over. Punishing allows to reaffirm one’s 
image as a reasonable player, but at a stage in which reasonableness 
is doubtful. 
For n < N – na – nb both know that they have a reasonable strategy 
and that, for both, ministering a just sufficient punishment allows to 
reassert one’s image of reasonableness at a stage in which having 
such an image is worthwhile. 
Then, playing rea is the announcement and actual adoption of the 
strategy of cooperation and persistence in cooperation till the other 
cooperates; replying to a non cooperative move with a just sufficient 
punishment with reversion to cooperation at the following stage at 
least till N – na – nb, possibly till N – na,
23 leaving uncertain how one 
                                                     
19 To reasonableness, of course. 
20 Though not necessarily must. 
21 With the chance of shifting to bi increasing as one moves from N – na to 
N – nb.
22 One needs to punish, in the attempt to re-establish credibility in applying 
the reasonable rule, but the period of punishment would end at a stage in 
which reasonableness itself requires the use of bi. 
23 If the other always plays cooperative in these stages. 12
will play in the stages from N – na to stage N – nb.
24
If N is sufficiently large, then, one has the possibility to follow rea-
sonableness in alternative to using immediately backward induction. 
It is known that reasonableness must be abandoned at some point, 
but the point at which it is rational to do so is uncertain, and anyway 
very near the end of the game. They can both use reasonableness, or 
one of them just an accommodating strategy to reasonableness; for 
most of the game, however, accommodation and reasonableness will 
be indistinguishable. Both have the means and the incentives to ac-
quire the image of a reasonable player, and they can do so at a lim-
ited cost. 
As for the second step of the reasoning, assume to be at the begin-
ning of the game, so that n = 0, and consider the choice between fol-
lowing backward induction from the start or following reasonable-
ness. In the underlying game, they are facing a stag hunt game in the 
choice of the interpretation of the overt one and the rule to follow 
when choosing the strategy in playing it.
25 They know that this is 
just the first occasion in which they have to choose the kind of ra-
tionality each will follow, the first of a finite sequence of choices of 
the same kind; furthermore, they know that, as n reaches N - nb, the 
stag hunt game degenerates into a prisoners’ dilemma in which fol-
lowing backward induction becomes the only choice consistent with 
rationality, and will dictate playing nc in the overt game. In a stag 
hunt game, of the possible Nash equilibria, reasonableness selects 
the one Pareto efficient. However, the fact that these games have 
more than one equilibrium makes at least uncertain how they will be 
played by rational players. In all cases, it will anyway be uncertain 
the exact point at which the sequence will degenerate into a prison-
ers’ dilemma. So, they are not forced to solve backwards the se-
quence of underlying games and this gives both players a reason to 
                                                     
24 Provided one reaches these stages from a sequence of cooperative mo-
ves.
25 Depending on the choice they make, this will decide whether they will 
play c or nc at the current stage of the overt game, remembering that, whe-
ther they choose rea or ac, they must anyway play c, at this stage. 13
choose reasonableness
26 or at least accommodation, and to believe 
that also the other player will do so. 
Attaining the efficient equilibrium requires both players to coordi-
nate on this choice. In a one shot stag hunt game there is no mecha-
nism which can produce this coordination. But till there are enough 
stages to go, players know that they can test and be tested
27 for the 
resolve to abide by reasonableness without destroying the justifica-
tion for following it in the rest of the game. Abiding by the rule is 
not costless
28 but neither too costly with respect to the prospective 
gains reaped if one’s reasonableness is believed. Prospective gains 
diminish as n moves towards N – nb; one knows that a stage will be 
reached in which it is no longer possible to support belief in the re-
spect of the rule associated to reasonableness by punishment, in 
                                                     
26 Play c, unless the other played nc at the previous stage, in which case 
play nc for a number of stages just sufficient to worsen the payoff of the 
other and then go back to c. 
27 The fact that one is playing a sequence of stag hunt games gives further 
reasons for using lenient strategies with regard to punishment in case of 
deviation. In a one-shot stag hunt game, there are no ways to send credible 
signals to the other. But in a sequence of games of this kind, behaviour at 
one stage, especially if potentially costly, allows signalling on the equilib-
rium in the game in rationality on which coordination is sought and, at least 
at the beginning of a sufficiently long sequence, a round differs very little 
from that immediately following. When using the harsh strategy, one need-
lessly limits the usefulness of these signals in the event the other deviates. 
The behaviour kept before the deviation by the player defaulted upon will 
not work as a signal about future behaviour since the announcement would 
now require the defaulted always to play according to bi. In a sense, it 
would truncate what will be shown to be a sequence of stag hunt games in 
the choice of rationality, as playing down does in the centipede game, and 
yet truncation is not credible much for the same reasons for which the 
threat was not. By using a harsh strategy, one puts one’s image at risk. One 
can go back to cooperation, or to reasonableness, only by loosing one’s 
face but a loss of face introduces a discontinuity in the sequence of stag 
hunt games in the sense that one cannot actually refer to what has gone on 
before in the underlying game to form ideas about how it will be played 
after a deviation has occurred. 
28 One has to run the risk of being defaulted. 14
which, therefore, coordination on the efficient pure strategy equilib-
rium in the stag hunt game cannot be taken for granted. But, till al-
most the end of the game, the exact point at which the underlying 
game will degenerate into a prisoners’ dilemma remains uncertain. 
At difference from the centipede, in which, to reason backward, one 
needs to use a counterfactual which is inconsistent with the prem-
ises,
29 in the finite prisoners’ dilemma, no such counterfactual is 
needed, so one can, consistently with rationality, either reason back-
ward or reason forward. 
In the first case, backward induction, or equivalently, in this case, 
iterated delation of dominated strategies, leads to the use of bi from 
the start. In the second, at each stage, they must decide how to play a 
stag hunt game which will be followed by another, slightly differ-
ent,
30 stag hunt game and so on in a sequence; though they both 
know this length has an upper bound, how long the sequence will go 
on, or better which behaviour rationality dictates in playing this 
game is uncertain.
31
Using bi from the start, but also both using reasonableness
32 can 
then be seen as pure strategy equilibria of this game. In the case of 
the repeated prisoner’s dilemma, this choice is repeated stage after 
stage so that both have incentives and means to induce each other to 
coordinate on the efficient equilibrium. 
Uncertainty about the way in which it is rational to play arises here 
endogenously but anyway allows to use the reasoning of Kreps - 
Milgrom - Roberts - Wilson (1982), just substituting rea for the tit-
for-tat strategy.
33 In this latter reading, the possibility of reasonable-
ness transforms a game of complete information into one of incom-
plete, though symmetric, information by associating to the choice of 
strategies in the overt game a sequence of games in which the choice 
                                                     
29 A fact that forces to reason forward if one wants to avoid this inconsis-
tency. 
30 Since maximal pay-offs decrease stage after stage. 
31 Which makes impossible to use backward induction. 
32 Or just one of them doing so, with the other playing accommodating. 
33 But if a + b < 2, rea dictates a strategy very near to tit-for-tat, that fur-
thermore avoids perverse loops. 15
concerns the kind of rationality to use.
34
The fact that, till almost the end, the kind of rationality it is substan-
tively rational to use is uncertain blocks backward induction. Choos-
ing bi by both players at each stage is an equilibrium, but if just one 
of the two intends to use rea, he has means to signal this fact to the 
other, indeed means to falsify the expectation of the other and to in-
duce him to revise his priors about the choice of the former. Actu-
ally, one can claim that, since rea is instrumentally superior to bi, 
rational players must use rea. Notice that what one is signalling is 
the reading of the game one adopts, and though maximal payoffs 
decrease as N approaches, the reasons for adopting a given reading 
do not change, so it is debatable also whether the value of these sig-
nals depends on the number of stages still to go, till almost the end 
of the game.
35
As to the overt, level 1 game one has attached an underlying, level 2 
game, one can attach to the level 2 game a level 3 game in which 
one has to decide how to play the level 2 game, and to the level 3 a 
level 4 game, the sequence going on to infinity. But in this sequence, 
the level n game is identical to that of level n-1, for n > 2. How to 
behave in this sequence is decided privately by each agent, and con-
                                                     
34 When the number of rounds to play is very high and one associates each 
round with an underlying game in the choice of rationality, one will fall in 
the domain of the Folk Theorem. One can support abiding by an agreement 
which distributes payoffs in a different way than at the (cooperate, cooper-
ate) equilibrium with a reasoning similar to that employed above but notice 
that, as one moves away from that equilibrium, even the most lenient but 
sufficient punishment must become harsher, if the defaulter is the one 
which is made worse off by the agreement with respect to the (cooperate, 
cooperate) equilibrium; it must require non cooperation by the one de-
faulted upon for a higher number of rounds, and therefore it will be both 
more costly for the defaulted to minister the punishment and it will cease to 
be effective as a threat sooner. 
35 Furthermore, the strategy required by rea becomes a substantively ra-
tional strategy in the overt game, if a player is faced by an appropriate pun-
ishment threat in case of deviation, when the number of stages becomes 
indefinite. In this sense, the (rea; rea) equilibrium converges to a substan-
tively rational equilibrium strategy of the overt game as the number of 
stages tends to infinite. 16
sistency requires the same choice is made, stage after stage, con-
firming the choice made at stage 2, which however depends on the 
information the agent has at the stage reached in the overt game.
36
A dilemma of an economic theorist 
In the repeated prisoners’ dilemma, players can talk to each other, 
can announce they intend to play reasonable and, if the argument 
given above holds, the announcement is credible. If both players are 
substantively rational and have common knowledge both of rational-
ity and of the possibility of reasonableness, the announcement is 
however unnecessary: common knowledge of substantive rationality 
must induce them to believe each will play either reasonable or ac-
commodating. Both these alternatives lead to the same sequence of 
moves in the overt game, except for the very last stages, but what 
one will do at that stage is immaterial, since they will be reached 
while both play c. 
When the game is put in normal form, what reasonableness does is 
to question the rationality of using iterated deletion of dominated 
strategies. But iterated deletion of dominated strategies is used also 
to solve games which require players to make just one move, to take 
a once for all decision which cannot be revised afterwards but based 
on the solution of games played inwardly by each agent. 
A simple example is Basu’s traveller game. Two players are asked 
to choose separately a number in the interval [150; 300]. The player 
that chooses the smallest wins and gets a payoff equal to the number 
chosen plus 5, while the other receives a payoff equal to the smallest 
number chosen minus 5. If both choose the same number, the get a 
payoff equal to the number chosen. 
Iterated deletion of dominated strategies leads both players to practi-
cally the worst possible result. In fact, at each stage of the process, 
they are simultaneously solving a prisoners’ dilemma, and the final 
result is the one expected when playing a finite sequence of prison-
                                                     
36 Note that, attaching an underlying game in the choice of rationality to a 
one-shot prisoner’s dilemma, leaves the substantive rationality of substan-
tive rationality unaffected. 17
ers’ dilemmas, in which, in the stage game, the strategies are: push 
backward induction one step farther (P), stop backward induction 
(S). The payoff matrix of this stage game is that given in fig. 2.  
            1 \ 2                   P                   S 
               P              - 1 ; - 1              + 4 ; - 5 
               S              - 5 ; + 4                 0 ; 0 
Fig. 2 
Each stage of iterated deletion is simply the decision to push back-
ward induction one step farther, a step forced by the fact that the 
other too must do so. In this case, the only reasonable strategy is to 
give up any use of backward induction since the game of choice of 
rationality is not going to be repeated. The accommodating strategy 
is to use backward induction for just one step, trusting in the reason-
ableness of the other. 
Rubinstein (2004) gives some very interesting statistics about the 
way people actually play this game. In a population made up of uni-
versity students from different faculties, the percentage using what 
appears to be the unique equilibrium strategy is exceedingly low; by 
far the highest plays strategies that are far from the “equilibrium” 
one, mostly however concentrated around the strategies which, if 
played by both agents, would grant them nearly the highest gain 
which could be obtained, the reasonable and the accommodating 
ones coming out on top. 
If one accepts the reasoning usual in game theory, one can wonder 
whether university students are rational. Of course, one can devise 
reasons which make their behaviour rationally justifiable. If most 
had used backward induction for just one step, this would be consis-
tent with all players being substantively rational when facing the 
overt game, but most of them thinking that substantive rationality is 
quite uncommon. Doing so for a few steps would be consistent with 
knowledge that iteration is usually followed only for a very few 
rounds.
But it can also be that they are substantively rational, that they be-
lieve that substantive rationality is very common, but is applied in 18
the underlying game of choice of rationality, and therefore choose 
either a reasonable or an accommodating strategy.
37 From this point 
of view, students would be substantively rational just because they 
do not play the “equilibrium” strategy in the overt game, and even 
when they choose a best response to the best reasonable strategy, 
they trust in the substantive rationality of the other. 
Closing remarks 
The use of reasonableness allows to introduce uncertainty endoge-
nously, in a “natural” way and captures most of what one wants 
from imperfect knowledge about the type of the other player, or   
bounded or ε-rationality (Radner (1980), but it allows for a wider 
variety of reasonable equilibria due to the characteristics of the set 
of equilibria of the underlying games which it generates. Though a 
reasonable strategy cannot be substantively rational in the usual 
sense, it can be justified much on the same ground as the one used to 
defend the latter, that of instrumentality in the pursuit of one’s aims. 
In experimental situations, it is perhaps not always easy, but it is 
presumed possible, through a careful description, to control how a 
player reads the overt game. Control of the existence, and more of 
the characteristics, of an underlying game a player can add to the 
overt one can be substantially more difficult. 
Discovering what reasonableness requires in the overt games exam-
ined, though it may have alternatives, seems to have a natural candi-
date. In different games, what reasonable means can be much more 
obscure. This by itself does not destroy the point one has been trying 
to make but there are at least two caveat.
The fact that the overt game can be endowed with two or more 
equally tenable, but inconsistent, criteria of reasonableness, can give 
                                                     
37 Reaction times of those choosing the reasonable strategy are lower than 
those of students choosing the “rational one”. Of course, the reasoning to 
do once reasonableness is chosen is shorter but one must first compare rea-
sonableness and rationality. May be there is some unknown mental mecha-
nism which distinguishes and separates automatically situations in which 
reasonableness is better. Could it be that evolution implanted reasonable-
ness in our brain? 19
rise to an infinite regress of decisions about the rationality it is ra-
tional to use to define what reasonableness means. 
There is the possibility that what reasonableness means could be 
quite clear for both players, but both have reasonable strategies that 
are however inconsistent with each other, at least for some of the 
initial stages, and imply best responses inconsistent with each other.  
In both cases, the game in the choice of rationality would loose the 
simple structure here exploited. 
The fact that one follows substantive rationality in the choice of ra-
tionality, but then, the substantively rational kind of rationality to 
use can turn out to be reasonableness can make difficult to read the 
world one lives in. Consider the statistics about the way people play 
Basu’s game. Do they support the view we live in a world of irra-
tional or of somewhat sophisticated
38 persons? 
In the circumstances examined above, playing reasonable is behav-
ing nice to the other agent. But is this niceness anything but shrewd 
and unrelenting selfishness? 
One can choose one type of rationality over another on the basis of 
its instrumental value in playing the overt game, but also because 
they give it some sort of intrinsic merit. Does the reasoning behind a 
choice, the justification and meaning one gives to it, in a sense, the 
why and the way a state is reached, besides the properties of the 
state itself, have an independent merit which should be considered? 
Questions of this kind suggest that Newcomb’s paradox situations 
may be more common than one thinks.
39
                                                     
38 Assuming reasonableness requires some sophistication. 
39 Far from playing malicious, what the genie seems to be asking to his 
subject is to abide by the politeness rule of never choosing the unique best 
(See Baigent - Gaertner (1996)). Assume the genie is indifferent between 
putting a million pounds in the second box or nothing. Opening the second 
box only would be a reasonable behaviour as opposed to that substantively 
rational of opening both. A rational person would then choose to be rea-
sonable. But in so doing he would choose the unique best in the game of 
rationality. Since that would entail the genie to put nothing in the second 
box, opening the first would be again to go for the unique best. Should the 
genie put a million in the second box only if the subject does not open any 
of them? 20
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gest slice of a pie, if the guest knows that by being polite he will get one’s 
appreciation and is, perhaps strategically, bent on getting it? Should one 
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